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Abstract 
The assessment of an offender’s risk of recidivism is emerging as a key consideration in 
sentencing policy in many American jurisdictions. However, little information is available on 
how actual sentencing judges view this development. This study surveys the views of a 
population sample of judges in Virginia, the state that has gone farther than any other in 
legislatively mandating risk assessment for certain drug and property offenders. Results indicate 
that a strong majority of judges endorse the principle that sentencing eligible offenders should 
include a consideration of recidivism risk. However, a strong majority also report the availability 
of alternatives to imprisonment in their jurisdictions to be inadequate at best. Finally, most 
judges oppose the adoption of a policy requiring them to provide a written reason for declining to 
impose alternative interventions on “low risk” offenders. 
Keywords: Risk assessment, sentencing, judicial process, recidivism 
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Judicial Appraisals of Risk Assessment in Sentencing 
Introduction 
The assessment of an offender’s risk of recidivism was once a central component of criminal 
sentencing in the United States. In California, for example, indeterminate sentencing—whereby 
an offender is given a relatively low minimum sentence and a relatively high maximum sentence 
and released from prison when he or she is believed to present a low risk of recidivism—was 
introduced in 1917 (Monahan & Skeem, 2014, 2016). Ernest Burgess published the first 
statistical instrument to assess an offender’s risk of recidivism in 1928 (Gottfredson & Snyder, 
2005). In the mid-1970s, however, indeterminate sentencing based on forward-looking utilitarian 
assessments of offender risk fell into desuetude in many American jurisdictions in favor of 
determinate periods of confinement based on backward-looking retributive appraisals of offender 
blameworthiness (Tonry, 2013). 
In recent years, however, in response both to a plummeting crime rate (Zimring, 2012) and 
to a surging—and unsustainable—rate of imprisonment (Travis, Western, & Redburn, 2014), 
there has been a resurgence of interest in risk assessment in sentencing (Simon, 2005; Heilbrun, 
Hart, & Green, 2009; Hyatt, Bergstrom, & Chanenson, 2011). Many have begun to argue that 
one way to begin dialing down “mass incarceration” without simultaneously jeopardizing the 
historically low crime rate is to put risk assessment back into sentencing. It has recently been 
estimated at least 20 states have begun to incorporate risk assessment into the sentencing process 
“in some or all cases” (Starr, 2014, p. 809).  Many jurisdictions have similarly incorporated risk 
assessment into decisions made in the pre-trial process, including as an alternative to bail, as well 
as in juvenile cases, and when selecting conditions in correctional settings and during probation. 
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In the present study we gauge the benefits and the costs of reliance on risk assessment, as 
seen by the judges responsible for imposing sentences. As Hyatt and Chanenson (2016, p. 16) 
have recently stated, “As the primary ‘consumer’ of the results of at-sentencing risk assessments, 
the reactions and desires of members of the judiciary should be obtained and considered as key 
components of any coordinated at-sentencing risk assessment policy.” First, however, we place 
risk assessment in sentencing in jurisprudential context, and describe how risk assessment 
operates in Virginia, the jurisdiction that we studied.  Virginia has gone farther than any other in 
legislatively mandating risk assessment for certain drug and property offenders.  In the words of 
the new Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 2017, p. 375), “On risk assessment as a 
prison-diversion tool, Virginia has been the leading innovator among American states” (see also 
Elek, Warren, & Casey, 2015).  For that reason, the views of judges in Virginia towards risk 
assessment are a particularly important subject of study 
The role of risk assessment in a “hybrid” system of sentencing 
The American Law Institute’s highly-influential Model Penal Code (2017) has explicitly 
adopted a hybrid  approach to sentencing that incorporates risk assessment in sentencing 
decisions. A key provision of the Code (§ 6B.09(3)) provides that state sentencing commissions: 
shall develop actuarial instruments or processes to identify offenders who present an 
unusually low risk to public safety. … When accurate identifications of this kind are 
reasonably feasible, for cases in which the offender is projected to be an unusually low-risk 
offender, the sentencing court shall have discretion to impose a community sanction rather 
than a prison term, or a shorter prison term than indicated in statute or guidelines. 
This approach is a hybrid as between what almost all scholars of sentencing distinguish as two 
broad and polar opposite approaches to the allocation of criminal punishment. One of these 
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approaches is usually termed retributive and the other utilitarian. Adherents of the retributive 
approach believe that an offender’s moral culpability for crime committed in the past should be 
the sole consideration in determining his or her punishment. In the best known retributive theory, 
known as “just deserts” (von Hirsch, 1976), offenders should be punished “because they deserve 
it, and the severity of their punishment should be proportional to their degree of 
blameworthiness” (Frase, 2013, p. 8) for the crimes they have committed in the past, and to 
nothing else. 
In stark contrast, advocates of the utilitarian approach believe that punishment is justified 
principally by its ability to decrease future criminal acts by the offender or by deterring other 
would-be offenders from committing—or continuing to commit—crimes (Slobogin, 2011). 
Many legal scholars, however, have argued that any workable theory of sentencing must 
address both retributive and utilitarian concerns, rather than just one of them. The most 
influential hybrid theory of sentencing is the one developed by Norval Morris (1974) which he 
called “limiting retributivism.” In Morris’s theory, retributive principles can only set an upper 
(and perhaps also a lower) limit on the severity of punishment, and within this range of what he 
called “not undeserved” punishment, utilitarian concerns—such as the offender’s risk of 
recidivism—can be taken into account. Reitz (2011, p. 472) elaborates Morris’ view: 
Here, proportionality in punishment is understood as an imprecise concept with a margin of 
error, not reducible to a specific sanction for each case. The “moral calipers” available to 
human beings are set wide, the theory asserts, producing a substantial range of justifiable 
sentences for most cases. 
In such a hybrid system, as the Model Penal Code explains, risk assessment can be used to 
identify low risk offenders, who are then recommended for alternative sentences. 
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“Nonviolent risk assessment” in Virginia 
 In 1994, the Virginia General Assembly required the state’s newly-formed Criminal 
Sentencing Commission to develop an empirically-based risk-assessment instrument for use in 
diverting 25 percent of the “lowest-risk, incarceration-bound, drug and property offenders” to 
non-prison sanctions such as jail, probation, community service, outpatient substance-abuse or 
mental health treatment, or electronic monitoring (Kern & Farrar-Owens, 2004; Farrar-Owens, 
2013; Kleiman, Ostrom, & Cheesman, 2007). The risk factors included on the original version of 
the tool developed by the Commission—termed the “Nonviolent Risk Assessment” (NVRA)—
consisted of six types of variables: offense type, whether the offender was currently charged with 
an additional offense, “offender characteristics” (i.e., gender, age, employment, and marital 
status), whether the offender had been arrested or confined within the past 18 months, prior 
felony convictions, and prior adult incarcerations. In 2012, the Commission re-validated this 
risk-assessment instrument on large samples of eligible drug and property (i.e., larceny and 
fraud) offenders. In these samples, 63% of drug offenders scored in the “low-risk” group and 
37% scored in the “higher-risk” group, while 43% of the property offenders scored in the low-
risk group and 57% scored in a higher-risk group. Of drug offenders designated as low risk, 12% 
recidivated; by comparison, 44% of higher-risk drug offenders recidivated. Of  property 
offenders designated as low risk, 19% recidivated; by comparison, 38% of higher-risk property 
offenders recidivated (Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2012). Recidivism in this 
research was defined as reconviction for a felony offense within three years of release from 
incarceration. 
The NVRA, revised after the 2012 re-validation, is administered only to offenders for whom 
the state’s sentencing guidelines recommend incarceration. In addition, offenders must meet 
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certain eligibility criteria (e.g., no prior convictions for violent crime). If the offender’s total 
score on the instrument is below a specified cut-off—the cut-off being chosen to yield the 
legislatively-mandated 25 percent “lowest risk” criterion for diversion—he or she is 
recommended for an alternative, community-based sanction; if the offender’s score on the 
instrument is above that cut-off, the prison or jail term recommended in the state’s sentencing 
guidelines remains in effect.  
The sentence ultimately imposed is within the discretion of the individual Circuit Court 
judge presiding in the case.  Moreover, the alternative sentences imposed are not departures from 
sentencing guidelines, since they are recommended as part of the modified guidelines. In fiscal 
year 2016, among offenders scored as low risk by the NVRA, 42.2 percent were in fact 
sentenced by the judge to a community-based program rather than to prison (Garrett, Jakubow, & 
Monahan, 2018).  
Method 
Between November 2017 and January 2018 we conducted a mail survey of all 161 
Circuit Court judges in Virginia. In Virginia, each city and county has a Circuit Court, which 
handles all criminal felony cases; there are 31 Circuits and 161 Circuit Court judges.  Virginia is 
one of two states in which judges are selected by legislative election, based on a majority vote of 
the Virginia House of Delegates and Senate.  Circuit Court judges serve for terms of eight years.   
Responses were received from 85 judges (a response rate of 52.8 percent). To our 
knowledge, this is the highest response rate to a statewide judicial survey ever reported.  
(Surveys of federal judges, however, have reported similarly high response rates (e.g. U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 2015).  The survey consisted of questions addressing the judge’s views 
of, and experience with, the NVRA instrument, the availability of alternative sentencing options 
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in his or her judicial circuit, and the judge’s reactions to a hypothetical procedure whereby a 
community program rather than incarceration would be the presumptive sentence for an offender 
assessed as at low risk of recidivism. A final open-ended question invited judges to elaborate on 
their views of risk assessment in sentencing. 
Results 
Four questions addressed judges’ views of, and experience with, the use of the NVRA 
instrument in sentencing. The first question (Q1) was: “Check the option that best reflects your 
view of the proper role of risk assessment in sentencing eligible drug and property offenders,” 
with the responses being “(1)  Sentencing drug and property offenders should be based only on 
the seriousness of the crime committed and the offender’s blameworthiness; the risk an offender 
will commit another crime in the future should play no role in sentencing; (2) Sentencing drug 
and property offenders should be based not only on the seriousness of the crime committed and 
the offender’s blameworthiness, but also on the risk the offender will commit another crime in 
the future,” [and] (3) Other” (emphases in original).  
The second question (Q2) was: “How familiar are you with the use of the Nonviolent 
Risk Assessment in sentencing drug and property offenders in Virginia?,” with the responses 
being “(1) Very familiar; (2) Familiar; (3) Slightly familiar; [and] (4) Unfamiliar.” 
The third question (Q3) was: “How often do you consider the results of the Nonviolent 
Risk Assessment worksheet before sentencing a drug or property offender?,” with the responses 
being “(1) Always or almost always (i.e., in about 90-100% of the cases); (2) Usually (i.e., in 
about 50-90% of the cases); (3) Sometimes (i.e., in about 10-50% of the cases), (4) Rarely (in 
about 1-10% of the cases), [and] (5) Never (in 0% of the cases).” 
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The final question (Q4) in this section was: “When sentencing a drug or property 
offender, do you rely on your judicial experience, or on the Nonviolent Risk Assessment, to 
determine the risk that the offender will commit another crime?,” with the responses being “(1) I 
rely primarily on the Nonviolent Risk Assessment worksheet; (2) I rely primarily on my judicial 
experience; (3) I rely equally on the Nonviolent Risk Assessment worksheet and on my judicial 
experience;  [and] (4) I do not believe the risk an offender will commit another crime should play 
a role in sentencing, and therefore I do not rely on either the Nonviolent Risk Assessment 
worksheet or on my judicial experience.” 
Judges’ responses to these questions are contained in Table 1. In summary: 
(1) Eight-out-of-ten judges believe that sentencing drug and property offenders should be 
based not only on the seriousness of the crime committed and the offender’s 
blameworthiness, but also on the risk the offender will commit another crime in the 
future. 
(2) Eight-out-of-ten judges state that they are either “familiar” or “very familiar” with the 
use of NVRA instrument in sentencing drug and property offenders. 
(3) Approximately half of all judges state that they “always” or “almost always” consider 
the results of the NVRA instrument in sentencing drug and property offenders, and 
approximately one-third state that they “usually” do so. 
(4) Approximately half of all judges state that they rely equally on the NVRA instrument 
and on their judicial experience in sentencing a drug or property offender, and 
approximately one-third state that they rely primarily on their judicial experience. 
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Two questions addressed judges’ views on the availability of alternative sentencing 
options in his or her judicial circuit. The first question in this section (Q5) was: “How would you 
rate the current availability of alternative interventions—such as outpatient drug or mental health 
programs—as realistic sentencing options for drug and property offenders within the jurisdiction 
served by your Court?,” with the responses being “(1) Excellent; (2) Adequate; (3) Less than 
adequate” [and] (4) Virtually non-existent.” 
The second question (Q6) was: “If, in the future, alternative interventions became more 
available as realistic sentencing options for drug and property offenders within the jurisdiction 
served by your Court, would this change your sentencing practices?,” with the responses being 
“(1) Yes, I would sentence offenders to alternative interventions more often; (2) No, I would not 
sentence offenders to alternative interventions more often; [and] (3) I do not know whether or 
not this would have an effect on my sentencing practices.” 
Judges’ responses to both of these questions are contained in Table 2. In summary: 
(5) Seven-out-of-ten judges rate the availability of alternative interventions—such as 
outpatient drug or mental health programs—within their jurisdiction as “less than 
adequate,” and five percent of judges rate such alternatives as “virtually non-existent.” 
(6) Three-quarters of the judges responded affirmatively when asked whether an increase 
in the availability of alternative interventions for drug and property offenders would 
change their sentencing practices.  
Two questions addressed judges’ reactions to a hypothetical procedure whereby a 
community program rather than incarceration was made the presumptive sentence for an 
offender who scored as low risk on the NVRA. The first question in this section (Q7) was: “As 
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you know, a judge is not obligated to sentence within the range recommended by the Sentencing 
Guidelines. However, in cases in which a judge elects to sentence outside the Guidelines’ 
recommended range, he or she must provide a written reason for the departure (Code of Virginia 
§ 19.2-298.01). Assume a similar procedure were adopted for sentencing recommendations 
based on risk assessment. That is, assume that when an eligible drug or property offender scored 
as “low risk” on the Nonviolent Risk Assessment—and was therefore recommended for an 
alternative intervention—the judge were required to provide a written reason if he or she 
declined to impose such an alternative intervention. In your view, would the adoption of a 
procedure similar to the one described above increase the likelihood of judges imposing an 
alternative intervention when one is recommended by the Nonviolent Risk Assessment?,” with 
the responses being “(1) Definitely increase the likelihood of an alternative intervention; (2) 
Probably increase the likelihood of an alternative intervention; (3) Probably not increase the 
likelihood of an alternative intervention; [and] (4) Definitely not increase the likelihood of an 
alternative intervention.” 
The second question in this section (Q8) was: “Would you favor the adoption of a 
procedure similar to the one described above? [i.e., in Q7],” with the options being “(1) Strongly 
favor the adoption of such a procedure; (2) Favor the adoption of such a procedure; (3) Oppose 
the adoption of such a procedure; [and] (4) Strongly oppose the adoption of such a procedure.” 
Judges’ responses to both of these questions are contained in Table 3. In summary: 
(7) When asked whether adopting a policy requiring judges to provide a written reason 
for declining to impose an alternative intervention on an offender who scores as “low 
risk” would increase the likelihood of judges imposing such alternative interventions, six-
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in-ten judges believe that such a policy would increase the use of alternatives, and four-
in-ten believe that it would not increase the use of alternatives.   
(8) When asked if they favored or opposed the adoption of the policy described in the 
previous question, one-third of the judges responded that they favored adopting such a 
policy, and two-thirds responded that they opposed adopting such a policy. 
Judges’ responses were entered as ordinal variables into the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS, V.24). Because large numbers of participants provided similar responses, 
Goodman & Kruskal’s gamma (γ) tests were performed to identify correlations between items. 
Analysis of these data revealed ten statistically significant relationships, which can be found in 
Table 4. Belief that the proposed procedure would increase the use of alternative punishment was 
strongly correlated with support for the adoption of this procedure (γ = .82, p = .001) as well as 
the belief that augmenting community resources in the future would increase alternative 
punishment in sentencing (γ = .57, p = .001). A moderately strong correlation was found 
between support for this proposed procedure and believing that additional community-based 
sentencing options would increase the use of alternative punishment in the future (γ = .49, p = 
.005). 
Several statistically significant correlations were also identified for reliance on risk in 
sentencing, including a strong, positive association (γ = .74, p = .001) with utilizing the NVRA 
results in the sentencing process. The reliance on risk assessment item was also moderately 
correlated with the belief that a hypothetical procedure in which a community program rather 
than incarceration was made the presumptive sentence for an offender who scored as low risk 
would increase alternative punishment (γ = .38, p = .018) and with supporting the adoption of 
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the proposed procedure (γ = .47, p = .001). Four statistically significant correlations emerged 
with NVRA familiarity. NVRA familiarity was associated with frequency of NVRA use (γ = .51, 
p = .001) and with having adequate alternative programs within a jurisdiction (γ = .57, p = .001). 
Moderate associations were found between NVRA familiarity, reliance on risk assessment in 
sentencing (γ = .30, p = .046), and the belief that additional programs would increase alternative 
punishment (γ = .41, p = .047).  
Conclusion with Representative Comments from the Judges 
Our survey yielded three primary conclusions. First, a strong majority of judges endorse 
the principle that sentencing eligible drug and property offenders should include a consideration 
of the risk the offenders will commit new crimes, are familiar with the use of the NVRA in 
sentencing, and usually or always consider the results of the NVRA in relevant cases. However, 
a significant minority exclude considerations of risk when sentencing eligible drug and property 
offenders and are largely unfamiliar with the NVRA. This finding is in accord with that of Hyatt 
and Chanenson (2016, p. 10) that “broad-based opposition [to risk assessment] is limited, though 
present” among judges. 
• “Constitutes a useful tool within the general sentencing scheme.” 
• “I support the use of these risk assessments under current usage—
specifically the risk assessment is used to reduce and not increase 
incarceration recommendations.” 
• “It should be clarified to judges and litigants alike that Evidence Based 
Practices like the Nonviolent Risk Assessment are but another tool that aids 
but does not supplant judicial judgment.” 
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• “Frankly, I pay very little attention to the worksheets. Attorneys argue about 
them, but I really just look at the Guidelines.  I also don’t go to psychics.” 
Judicial education—both in the jurisprudential appropriateness of considering risk 
assessment in sentencing (e.g., American Law Institute, 2017) and in the vast behavioral 
science literature over the past sixty years indicating the clear superiority of statistical 
over subjective “experiential” risk assessment (Meehl, 1954; Silver & Chow-Martin, 
2002; Guay & Parent, 2018)—may improve this situation.   
Second, a strong majority of judges find the availability of alternative interventions for 
eligible drug and property offenders in their communities to be inadequate at best, and believe an 
increase in the availability of alternative interventions would change their sentencing practices.  
• “The assessment is useful. The problem is the lack of useful alternatives. In several 
counties in my Circuit, there are no inpatient treatment options.” 
• “We need more alternative options—lack sufficient treatment programs and follow-
up.  Unfortunately, that costs money which communities are reluctant to provide.” 
• “To accurately impose and/or consider whether or not a judge is complying with a 
recommendation— bona fide alternative programs must first exist.” 
• “There is presently no valid alternative in our area.  Referral to local mental health 
takes 13 weeks for the initial interview.  Who knows how long to start treatment… 
We need a statute which requires that all areas of the state have equal access to drug 
treatment.” 
Adopting a “justice reinvestment” model (Council of State Governments, 2018), whereby 
the fiscal benefits of reducing incarceration rates through the use of risk assessments are used to 
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offset the costs of expanding correctional alternatives to incarceration (e.g., community-based 
mental health and substance abuse programs) has the potential to increase the availability of such 
alternatives.  Relatedly, a “realignment” approach, where localities have fiscal incentives to 
reduce incarceration rates might also be a promising approach (Schlanger, 2013).  Neither 
approach has been adopted in Virginia to date. 
Finally, a majority of judges believe adopting a policy requiring a written reason for 
declining to impose an alternative intervention on eligible offenders who score as “low risk” 
would increase the likelihood such sentences would be imposed.  Currently, Virginia judges are 
asked to provide reasons when departing from sentencing guidelines, but the use or non-use of 
the NVRA is not considered a sentencing departure.  Requiring judges to express reasons might 
affect their behavior; one study of federal judges suggested that when reasons were required for 
sentencing departures, such departures were reduced (Freeborn and Hartmann, 2012).   
However, a majority of judges oppose the adoption of such a policy. 
• “Having to write out reasons for Guidelines departure is already an added time and 
effort burden on the sentencing process.  To add another requirement to explain the 
sentencing decision would simply complicate and drag out the sentencing even 
more. 
• “Requiring a reason in writing for a disposition should not be used as a way 
to compel more alternative punishments! At some point someone must 
realize that adding more paperwork…takes time and when court staffing 
remains the same, this takes time away from hearing cases, deciding cases, 
reading, signing orders, etc.” 
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• “Requiring judges to take 3-10 minutes per such sentencing to explain will 
be an unnecessary drag on our criminal dockets.” 
One approach that might reduce the perceived burden on judges in explaining reasons for 
not granting alternative sentences under the NVRA is the adoption of the automated web-based 
Sentencing Worksheets and Interactive File Transfer (“SWIFT”) program, which has now been 
pilot-tested in Virginia (Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2017).  This program will 
allow for much more rapid recording of all types of information required at sentencing, including 
the Nonviolent Risk Assessment for eligible offenders.  Drop-down menus could supply the most 
common reasons a judge might decline to impose an alternative intervention on an offender who 
scores as low risk (e.g., “I believe the offender’s risk is higher than indicated by the Nonviolent 
Risk Assessment,” “No appropriate community program to address this offender’s needs exists 
in this community,” or “The offender appears not to be responsive to treatment intervention” 
(Andrews, 2012).   
Virginia has long been considered at the forefront of American states in the use of risk 
assessment to provide “low risk” property and drug offenders with alternative, non-prison 
sentences. Yet judges in Virginia do not in fact impose alternative sentences on more than half of 
eligible low risk offenders (Garrett, Jakubow, & Monahan, 2018). To explore the reasons why 
that might be so, we surveyed all felony sentencing judges in the state. We found that most 
judges are familiar with and embrace risk assessment as a major consideration in sentencing 
property and drug offenders, but find that community alternatives to imprisonment in their 
jurisdictions are often scarce.  Further, most judges oppose the adoption of a policy requiring 
them to write out reasons for declining to impose alternative interventions on low risk offenders. 
Judicial education in structured risk assessment, increased resources for community programs 
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addressing criminogenic needs, and the adoption of automated web-based information systems 
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Table 1.  
Judges’ views of Non-Violent Risk Assessment (NVRA) in sentencing* 
Item Responses Frequency Percentage 
Q1. The proper role of NVRA in sentencing 
  
 NVRA should play no role 10 11.8 
 NVRA should play a role 67 78.0 
 Other 8 9.4 
Q2. Familiarity with NVRA   
 Very familiar 25 29.4 
 Familiar 41 48.2 
 Slightly familiar 16 18.8 
 Unfamiliar 3 3.5 
Q3. How often NVRA used   
 Always/almost always (90-100%) 39 46.4 
 Usually (50-89%) 24 28.6 
 Sometimes (10-50%) 8 9.5 
 Rarely (1-10%) 8 9.5 
 Never (0%) 5 6.0 
Q4. Rely on judicial experience or NVRA   
 Primarily NVRA 4   4.8 
 Equally NVRA and judicial experience 45 53.6 
 Primarily judicial experience 32 38.1 
 Not rely on NVRA 2  2.4 
*Q1 and Q2, n=85; Q3 and Q4, n = 84 
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Table 2.  
Availability of alternative sentencing options* 
 
Item Responses Frequency Percentage 
Q5. Current availability of alternative sentencing options 
  
 Excellent 8 9.5 
 Adequate 13 15.5 
 Less than adequate  59 70.2 
 Virtually non-existent  4 4.8 
Q6. Sentencing practices changed by increased options   
 Yes, sentence practices would change  64 76.2 
 No, sentencing practices would not change 1 1.2 
 Do not know re sentencing practices change 19 22.2 
* Q5 and Q6, n = 84 
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Table 3.  
Requiring written reasons for departure from the Nonviolent Risk Assessment (NVRA) sentence 
recommendation* 
Item Responses Frequency Percentage 
Q7. Requiring written reasons for departure would increase 
alternatives 
  
 Definitely increase alternatives 15 19.2 
 Probably increase alternatives 32 41.0 
 Probably not increase alternatives  23 29.5 
 Definitely not increase alternatives 8 10.3 
Q8. Favor written reasons for departure   
 Strongly favor  11 13.8 
 Favor 17 21.3 
 Oppose 32 40.0 
 Strongly oppose 20 25.0 
* Q7, n = 78; Q8, n = 80 
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Table 4. 
Correlation Matrix of Goodman & Kruskal's gamma for Judges’ Responses to Survey Questions 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Role 1.0        
2. Familiar .-32 1.0       
3. Often -.21 .51** 1.0      
4. Rely .13 .30* .74** 1.0     
5. Availability -.18 .57** .20 .33 1.0    
6. Future .26 -.12 -.10 .41* -.26 1.0   
7. Written .25 .14 .21 .38* .18 .57** 1.0  
8. Favor .34 -.15 .19 .47** .14 .49** .82** 1.0 
